10th Mediterranean Strategy Group

Participants: Emiliano Alessandri, Ekavi Athanassopoulou, Rym Ayadi, Rosa Balfour, Maurizio Barracco, Ambassador Assia Bensalah Alaoui, Benedetta Berti, Peter Brorsen, Massimo Carnelos, Virginie Collombier, Stephen Covington, Uri Dadush, Tulin Daloglu, Massimo Deandreis, Thanos Dokos, Hugo Doyle, Michael Eisenstadt, Amal El Obeidi, Eran Etzion, Admiral Mark Ferguson, Piero Gastaldo, Megan Greene, Ettore Greco, Danya Greenfield, Maria Elena Gutierrez, Brian Katulis, Kristina Kausch, Ambassador John Koenig, Michael Köhler, Ellen Laipson, Sir Michael Leigh, Ian Lesser, Bruno Lété, Christina Lin, Luigi Liccardo, William McIlhenny, Ambassador Alessandro Minuto-Rizzo, Soli Özel, Ambassador Marc Pierini, Matteo Quattrocchi, Nicolò Russo Perez, Marcello Sala, Ruth Santini, Berenike Schott, Claire Spencer, Anna Terrón Cusí, Nathalie Tocci, Alexander Verbeek, Özgür Ünlühisarcikli, Sharon White
Originally published by the OCP Policy Center

In partnership with OCP Policy Center, the Compagnia di San Paolo, and Noble Energy, the German Marshall Fund of the United States held its 10th Mediterranean Strategy Group (MSG) meeting in Naples, Italy under the theme “The United States & The Mediterranean: Past, Present and Future”.

MSG is the core convening activity of GMF’s Mediterranean policy program and the theme of this meeting was the evolving role of the U.S. in the Mediterranean, addressing topics such as trade and investment, regional security, and the outlook for transatlantic partnership in the Mediterranean. Around 40 experts and officials from the public and private sectors on both sides of the Atlantic and the Mediterranean met for two days of informal roundtable style discussion under the Chatham House rule.

The following is a brief summary of themes and discussions undertaken during the 10th meeting of the Mediterranean Strategy Group.

The American Mediterranean Experience: Assessing Two Centuries of Engagement

The opening session assessed the history and status of U.S. engagement in the Mediterranean region. The United States has been a Mediterranean power for nearly 200 years, and has become an established actor in the region in the economic, diplomatic, military and cultural sense. Moreover, the Mediterranean has had its own defining influence on aspects of American society. Because of 19^th and 20^th century migration flows, millions of people from the Mediterranean region brought their cultures and ideas to the U.S.

A defining factor of U.S. history and future policies in the Mediterranean continues to be its relationship with the Arab world. Both the 9/11 events and President Obama’s tenure in the White House have, in different ways, dramatically affected Arab perceptions of the U.S. role in the region. President Obama’s Cairo speech created high expectations among Arab leaders after a period of acute discomfort with President Bush’s “War on Terror.” This has led to a sense of disappointment in many quarters. Today, new dynamics further complicate Arab-U.S. relations. Washington’s failed attempts to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, a perception of equivocal US policies in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, the apparent preference for “leading from behind” in regional crises, and a hesitation to act on declared red lines in Syria, have added to the prevailing uncertainty about the future role of the in the Mediterranean.

Yet, actual U.S. engagement in the region is unlikely to decline for the foreseeable, and some trends and events could spur greater engagement. Recent developments touch on U.S. interests in the region, from the chaos in the Levant, to the return of old actors like Russia or the rise of new actors like China, to energy security and flux in Europe’s strategy toward the southern Mediterranean.

Despite the relative importance of the Mediterranean in U.S. policy objectives, there is surprisingly little institutional or intellectual consciousness in Washington regarding a distinct “Mediterranean space” In general, policies are shaped by a paradigm of bureaucratic division between Southern-Europe, North-Africa-Middle East, or through the lens of bilateral relations. This approach is in sharp contract with the European tradition of engaging -– or attempting to engage — with the Mediterranean region as a whole. As the U.S. is shaping its future policies toward the region, should Washington too, learn to look at the Mediterranean as one space, one geographic unity? Or should it recognize sub-regional clusters, such as the Levant plus Turkey? Or should it look at cross-regional frameworks in order to factor in the role of emerging actors, such as the Gulf States? Different potential frameworks exist, and each of them will characterize how the U.S. formulates its strategic goals in the Mediterranean&mdash,and how it acts on them.

Policies and Partnerships in the Central and Western Mediterranean

The second session addressed developments in the Central and Western Mediterranean, from Spain and Portugal to Morocco and Tunisia. This part of the Med has traditionally been a source of significant cooperation for the United States, with important links to security, economic development and regional integration. In contrast to the Eastern Mediterranean, this is also a region where the United States has been more comfortable with Europe taking the lead, for instance in the Libya military campaign. However, dramatic events in recent years have brought new dynamics to the region which may require the U.S. to rethink some of its policies and partnerships, and to seek a delicate balance between stability and democracy promotion. The U.S. faces such conundrums in its relations with Tunisia which is still going through an uncertain socio-economic-political transition, and in Morocco where efforts at reform unfold in a tough strategic environment; the process has not been easy anywhere. Libya is of particular concern, and poses challenges of a very different and more pressing kind. The country faces huge security challenges with potential spill-over effects to neighboring countries and Europe. If Libya is heading toward chaos and fragmentation, it is more likely to become an exporter of terrorism and a free gateway for uncontrolled migration.

The United States has a direct interest in addressing these challenges, and in this regard it should have a close partner in Europe, where political and security interests are even more directly engaged. The Central and Western Mediterranean offer transatlantic partners concrete opportunities to align their policies. How can the U.S. and the EU tackle some of the hard security challenges? How can they spur regional integration –- a perennial challenge — and what steps are needed in the field of economic cooperation, mobility and migration? How can the transatlantic partners support civil society and counter the demise of Western liberal values in the region? How can they prevent the disintegration of Libya? The discussion inevitably raised a host of open questions for transatlantic strategy.

Policies and Partnerships in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Levant

The third session addressed challenges in the Eastern Mediterranean, an area that remains unquestionably at the center of American regional concerns and engagement. From terrorism to energy, from maritime security to migration, the Levant and its immediate surroundings are at the forefront of U.S. and European concerns. The region is characterized by the erosion of state authority, the fading of national borders, tensions over the control of critical resources, and the rise of extremist, radical groups often fueled by revenues from organized crime, including human, drug and weapon trafficking. At the same time, returning and new actors such as Russia, China or Iran compete for economic, diplomatic and military clout in the region. Our current understanding of the Levant and Eastern Mediterranean no longer seems to provide satisfactory answers to the myriad of challenges, and a new paradigm for understanding the region is needed. In such a complex regional configuration there are no obvious policy choices for the United States. Often Washington finds itself in a difficult position where it encounters criticism for a perceived lack of engagement, or is accused of engaging too much.

At the heart of the geopolitical challenge lies the prospect of protracted chaos in Syria and Iraq. As Russia, China and Iran continue to support the Assad regime, the U.S. and its European allies need to seriously assess whether their strategy of support for the Free Syrian Army is delivering significant results. At the same time the rise of ISIS has added significantly to the complexity of the puzzle. The U.S. is leading an international campaign of airstrikes against the Khalifat, but without “boots on the ground” a quick defeat of ISIS is most unlikely. To the extent that ISIS gains momentum, it increasingly possesses the ability to destabilize other countries like Lebanon and Jordan, adding even more turmoil to the Middle East.

Amidst these developments Turkey will continue to play a vital role. Ankara certainly shares the concern for more stability in the region, but its objectives, priorities and motivations are not necessarily aligned with those of Washington and Brussels, often making Turkey appear as an intractable, uncooperative ally in the eyes of U.S. or European policy makers. As the U.S. continues to seek common ground with Ankara to bring stability to the Levant, bilaterally or through NATO, it will have to take into account the domestic considerations shaping foreign policy choices made by the ruling AK Party in Turkey.
Finally, on top of the military security agenda in the Levant, the Eastern Mediterranean has also become the theatre of a new energy security debate. The discovery of offshore gas riches stretching from Cyprus to Turkey, Lebanon and Israel has spurred a regional race for control over these resources. A paradox has emerged, where on the one hand energy policy is serving as a catalyst for renewed dialogue between regional actors, and on the other hand, political differences and commercial ambitions are generating tensions. Turkey’s relation with countries such as Greece or Israel will certainly define the future of this new energy equation. Moreover, our information concerning the real extent, volume and value of gas reserves available is still incomplete. This complicates the ability of stakeholders inside and outside the region to define their objectives and set priorities for cooperation. More exploration and development initiatives are needed. In this regard, the United States will continue to pursue a policy that encourages public-private partnerships.

The Economic Dimension: The American Role in Mediterranean Trade, Investment and Development

The fourth session took a closer look at the economic dimension, and the American role in Mediterranean trade, investment and development. Economic development has traditionally been a key theme for cooperation and integration around the Mediterranean, both north and south. In this sense, Europe, with its vast array of interests and commercial connections, has always been a leading player in the Mediterranean space. Hence the creation of initiatives such as the ‘Euro-Mediterranean Partnership’ or the ‘Union for the Mediterranean’, each of which has left a legacy of mixed results, at best. But new actors are also on the scene. The Gulf States have acquired an important role in investment and development, and China too has emerged as a new and important stakeholder. American economic and commercial activity has been less obvious, but the changing security environment is increasingly encouraging the U.S. to review some its trade and investment partnerships across the region.

Throughout recent history the Mediterranean has enjoyed a relative sense of prosperity. Today however, the region is facing important challenges due to the European financial crisis, chaos after the Arab uprisings and the economic slowdown in regional powers such as Turkey. As a result macro-economic conditions across the Mediterranean provide little reason for optimism in the near to mid-term. Inflation is up, trade balances are down, GDP growth is stuck, while Kafkaesque regulation, corruption and lack of infrastructure prevent businesses from performing at their best. Moreover, socioeconomic spillovers from the turmoil in the Middle East threaten further to destabilize some of the most vulnerable economies. It has been estimated that countries from North-Africa to the Middle East would need to sustain an average of 8% GDP growth annually in order to overcome their most pressing social challenges. This is an unrealistic target for most countries in the southern Mediterranean.

The United States, and Europe in particular, have an important role to play in this regard. Bilateral business and investment strategies could help stabilize the region, and at the same time address some of the U.S. and EU’s own homeland security concerns. The transatlantic partners should also look at enhancing the role of multilateral institutions, such as the EIB, EBRD, WB or IMF, who have substantial resources at hand but whose role in the Mediterranean is still relatively limited. Indeed, as the U.S. and Europe are currently dealing with their own financial woes, questions remain whether they can generate sufficient critical resources to move North Africa and the Middle East on a path toward sustainable growth. In this regard, it remains unclear which role other geo-political players, such as the Gulf States or China, will chose play in the future economic development of the region.

Does the US Have a Mediterranean Strategy? Does it Need One?

The final session analyzed whether the U.S. needs and is able to fashion a more explicit strategy toward the Mediterranean, and what the critical elements of such a strategy would be. By many measures, there are important security developments in the region that are making the Mediterranean more relevant to U.S. interests. From the threat posed by ISIS in the Levant to the disintegration of Libya and its potential to become a free haven for terrorists, to questions of proliferation and maritime security, Mediterranean problems occupy a great deal of attention in Washington. But to date these cross-regional and interconnected issues have not been translated by policy makers in Washington into an approach toward the region as a whole. The 2010 U.S. Security Strategy does not mention the word “Mediterranean”, and there are no initiatives between EUCOM and AFRICOM to design an integrated strategy for the northern and southern Mediterranean. The steady decline in American naval and other assets assigned to the Mediterranean per se (rather than in transit) offers another challenge when it comes to predictable presence in the region over the coming years.

At NATO, the institution that embodies a transatlantic approach, international staff and military representatives struggle to fully understand the evolving challenges in the Med. Despite having elaborated a “Strategy East” in response to events in Ukraine, to date NATO has no comparable “Strategy South”. Efforts to write one are now under way, but the Alliance is facing a daunting task. Unlike the situation in the East, where NATO faces a traditional territorial threat led by a single revisionist actor using (more or less) conventional means, the challenges South entail a diffuse set of networked state and non-state actors competing for influence along blurred ethnic and religious lines. They are disrupting not only the security, but also the socio-economic fabric of the involved societies. In the Mediterranean, the challenge is more diffuse, but no less pressing for exposed allies on both sides of the Atlantic, and their regional partners.

The unifying concept of a Mediterranean strategic space is increasingly elusive. Significant divergences among countries and at the sub-regional level work against Mediterranean cohesion in political, economic and security terms. This reality inevitably affects the nature of American policy. In the Mediterranean, in recent years, strategy has been driven by events rather than aspirations (there is, for example, no equivalent to the notion of “Europe whole and free,” looking south), with bilateral links at the fore. While the United States will keep playing a role in the future of the Mediterranean, and the demand for engagement may well increase, it is unclear how robust this role will be. In the 21^st century the U.S. seem to be moving to a security-construct where it no longer “owns” conflicts, but rather co-owns or partners with other actors to solve various crises. Taking this into account, perhaps opportunities can be created for the U.S. to work more effectively within NATO, and with the EU, on areas well within Europe’s reach? The Mediterranean could be a key test case for a new division of labor among transatlantic partners, although this approach, too, would bring some risks. Rapidly changing realities in countries such as Algeria, Egypt, Jordan -– even Turkey — will certainly encourage the U.S. to review some of its existing policies around the Mediterranean, and to align its partnerships accordingly.

Conference Program